

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

APAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent : -- KAWABE, Torashirō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I, KAWABE, Torashirō, was on duty from March, 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) to the end of February of the next year, as a section chief of the General Staff, taking charge of the affairs relative to tactics in the Central Military Supreme Command. During this term, I met with the outbreak of China Incident. I, therefore, depose on the problem concerning tactics of the Central Supreme Command, during the period from the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident to its early stages.

1. General survey by the Central Military Supreme Command of the world situation at the time just prior to the outbreak of the China Incident.

The Central Supreme Command, in order to draw up various plans of national defence and tactics, had to make, as a matter of course, a survey of the international situation of the time. In the spring of 1937 (the 12th year of Shōwa) when I took office as a section chief of the General Staff, the Central Supreme Command passed general judgement on the world situation of the time as roughly mentioned below:

"A. The European Powers are indicating their recovery at length from their exhaustion and debility from world War 1. Especially, the vivid foreign policies of Germany and Italy have been creating various causes which might give rise to new situations in the world. Various Western nations of the whole world are divided into two opposing groups of great influence. Such circumstances foreshadow that the time will come when both groups must be brought into a large-scale clash ultimately."

"B. The Soviet Union has step by step increased her national power by effecting the Industrial Five year Plan. She, at the same time, is making her stand clear, setting focus upon the international problem of interests rather than upon ideology or principles with which she has actively propagandized in the early period of foundation.

On the other hand, the military establishments in the eastern part of the Union have rapidly been strengthened of late and the parallel tracking of the Siberian Railway has been completed which has markedly increased its military value.

"C. Although such is the general situation of the Western Powers, any country would not be desirous of bringing about a great war and statesmen of the Powers will make great efforts to prevent a war.

Accordingly, no incident will probably occur in the immediate future, of such magnitude where the various Powers would be willing to stake their existence."

"D. In China, the real controlling power of the Nationalist Regime has grown more and more strong. They, however, refrain for the present as ever from making various sorts of direct anti-alien operations for restoring national rights. They have gradually come to realize the true intention of Japan on the Manchurian problem and have shown a tendency to bring about friendly relations with Japan, trying to make various agreements with Manchuria. Nevertheless, racial consciousness is inclined to become stronger among the intellectual people, students, etc.; anti-Japanese sentiment has gradually permeated students, soldiers, etc. and thus the anti-Japanese measures taken by the Chinese Communists are gaining ground."

11. Views of the Central Supreme Command of the time on national defence.

The Central Supreme Command, on the above judgment relative to the international situation, has the following view concerning the Japanese position in point of national defence:

"A. With a great international struggle which is sooner or later to be expected to break out among various Western nations, Japan has no moral or interested relations to be drawn into its vortex. Japan, therefore, ought to keep aloof from it."

"B. Steady progress of Manchoukuo as well as friendly and co-existent relations among the three states of Japan, China and Manchoukuo are what secure our national defence, maintaining the peace in the Orient. Whether anti-Japanese sentiment or contemptuous feeling towards Japan on the part of China will naturally disappear if the Japanese will reflect on their attitude and be prudent; and if the national strength of Japan becomes replete. As a result, true friendship and mutual respect among the aforementioned three states shall come into existence, by which any of these states can insure the security of national defence."

"C. When we reflect upon the actual conditions of Japanese national strength from the standpoint of national defence, we acknowledge that her strength is extremely inferior in various sorts of material factors necessary for self-defence and self-existence as a modern state. So long as the status quo remains as is, it cannot be guaranteed that the purposes of both first and second items mentioned above will be achieved."

With such a view of national defense, the Central Supreme Command had established the following principle since about half a year before March, 1937, when I took office. When I assumed my office, the chief of the First Division, a senior in office, fully explained the purport of this principle, which was as follows:

"In order to insure the country's peace and security in point of national defense at this moment when the new situation of the world has begun to show a delicate world move, the Army should make special efforts to improve itself in quality and efficiency. The military forces stationed in foreign territories should be very cautious in everything and restrain themselves and endeavor not to commit any faults that they might not occasion any international trouble. The Central Supreme Command, in cooperation with the military administrative authorities, should help them, directly or indirectly, in carrying out various national policies to promote our national power." This was at that time the principle and creed which all the personnel of the Central Supreme Command observed in unity.

3. The measures taken for the purpose of having the military forces understand completely the policy of the Central Supreme Command.

The aforementioned principle and policy were shown and explained by the Central Supreme Command's authorities at "the Conference of the Divisional and Army Commander's" which was held

in May, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa). Moreover the Central Supreme Command, on consulting with the War Ministry, sent Lt. Col. OKAMOTO, a competent officer, of the War Ministry to North China about June, 1937, for making an investigation of actual conditions of the Japanese forces in China which were in close contact with the Chinese forces in North China which seemed to be especially permeated with anti-Japanese sentiment, and, at the same time, to have the Japanese forces understand completely the purpose of the Central Supreme Command.

According to his report made on his return after having investigated thoroughly the conditions of the Japanese forces there, the principle of the Central Supreme Command was thoroughly understood by the Headquarters in China and every unit under its command, and ^{delete} we did not need to worry about the matter so far as the Japanese forces were concerned.

4. The program for operations in China at the time prior to the China Incident.

Japan, who had special relations with China, was often compelled to make a temporary despatch of forces on a small scale to China.

Accordingly, in the program for tactics in China for the year of 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), there was what corresponded to the case of calling for the sending of a part of the forces in order to secure our interests and to protect residents there.

But it was never intended to use military forces on a large scale in China, much less to draw out an overall operation plan over the broader range of the whole Chinese territory.

Only a plan was drawn out, for the time being, concerning the estimated number of detached forces, the name of the home division which shall take charge of detaching the forces, the measure for transporting the forces, the points of embarkation, etc., in case of need of sending forces for the purpose of protecting our interests and residents at every locality such as Tientsin-Peking Province, Tsintao, Shanghai, Swatow, Amoi, etc., which were closely connected with our country.

5. The duty of the Japanese garrison
in China and its special character

The duty of the Japanese garrison in China, equal to that of the Military forces of the Powers according to the Treaty of the Boxer's Rebellion in 1900 (the 33 year of Meiji), was in "guarding the legation quarters, securing the communication line from Beijing to the Sea port and protecting the residents." and the strength of the garrison in 1937 numbered about 7,000 in all. Of all troops stationed in foreign territory, this garrison had a special character as follows:

- A. It was absolutely a unit for guarding in a place, which had no military supplies and was hardly provided with ammunitions and equipments for military operation.
- B. It was not authorized to draw up a plan for military ^{delete} operation of itself in consideration of war.
- C. Notwithstanding the fact that it was a unit for guarding, stationed in Chinese territory, it was prohibited by the special order of the Central Supreme Command to do training, with the Chinese Army as its object.

6. The attitude of the Central Military
Supreme Command at the time the
Lu-kaw-chiao Incident broke out.

The first report, relating to the Lu-kaw-chiao Incident, which

broke out on the night of July 7th, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa), was received by the Central Supreme Command on the morning of July 8th, and I was notified as soon as I came to the office. The Central Supreme Command, on the whole, was calm. While I was thinking about it as an unpleasant event brought about by the Chinese, I did not take it as a grave matter; for there had so often been such similar trouble in the past that I simply considered that the matter, would, as usual be settled soon by mutual negotiation between the authorities of the Japanese and Chinese forces' there.

At the Central Supreme Command, we, the responsible persons, without holding any conferences in particular to deliberate on counter-measures for it, kept ourselves in touch with one another on the case as we were accustomed to for ordinary business. All concerned concurred in the opinion that we, in accordance with the aforementioned Central Supreme Command's policy and without any objections among ourselves, would prevent the incident from becoming enlarged, and to have the authorities at the spot settle the matter as soon as possible.

But the report which arrived on the 8th from the armed forces on the spot showed that the Chinese attitude was not necessarily so compromising that it would immediately put an end to the tense situation. Therefore, at about 6:30 p. m. on the same day, the Chief of General Staff gave, before anything else, a telegraphic order saying, "In order to prevent enlargement of the incident, you shall take more positive steps to avoid using military force and required prudence of the

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Commander of the Garrison in China.

On the following 9th, the central Command's instructions which were necessary for negotiations between both the Japanese and the Chinese forces at the spot to settle the incident was given by telegram to the Commander of the Garrison in China by the Vice Chief of the General Staff-- namely, "For the settlement of the Lukowchiao Bridge Incident, refrain from concerning yourselves in any political problem on this occasion and propose, in the main, the following requests to arrange for having the Hopei-Chahar authorities approve and execute them in the shortest time:

(1) Suspension of the stationing of Chinese forces near the Lukowchiao Bridge on the left bank of the Yungting River.

(2) Security necessary for the future

(3) Punishment of those directly responsible for the Incident

(4) Apology

VI. Arrangements made by the central Command in conformity with the change of situation following that of the preceding paragraph.

1. Informed by the report of our forces at the spot of the situation in which uncontrolled defiant actions were committed intermittently by the Chinese, (T.N. Hisenteki is a miswriting of, chosenteki) up to the morning of July 10th, the Central Command considered it necessary to reinforce to the Garrison in China, and on the evening of the 10th it was unofficially decided to reinforce it with two brigades from the Kwantung Army, with one division from Korea, and with three divisions and other units from Japan proper, and preparation lasted until the following 11th. But on the evening of the 11th, as the Garrison in China reported that the Chinese forces approved all our demands which had been under negotiation since yesterday, the Central Command determined immediately to stop the plan of mobilization of the divisions in Japan proper. Whereas the report of our attache to the Embassy at Nanking reported that the Chinese Central Command ordered the calling of air units and the concentration of four divisions in the northern provincial border regions of Honan Province. The Central Command then could not take an optimistic view regarding the situation in North China and was not confident of the Chinese forces in North China in carrying out their duties based on the conditions:

Therefore it was decided that only the above-mentioned forces from Korea and Manchuria preparing for expedition should take action as already arranged until the execution of the ^{conditions} was confirmed, and this order was issued at about 6:30 on the evening of the 11th.

2. Since then, while observing the situation, the central Command came to know various things from reports from various quarters up to the evening of July 13th, ^{delete} the outline of which were as follows:

(1) In North China, the Chinese forces have been not only making such preparations for war as building positions, transporting forces, etc. but also had fired on our forces who were passing in the suburbs south of Peking today.

(2) The Chinese Central Command ordered armed forces in every Province north of the Yangtze river to mobilize and to concentrate in regions along both the Lunghai and the Peiping-Hankow Railways. Facing the situation as mentioned above, the Central Command decided on the policy for dealing with these matters concerning the incident at 8 P.M. on the 13th. It was as follows:

(1) Our Army will adhere closely to the policy of non-enlargement of the situation or to settle locally and to make the utmost effort to avoid such actions that will lead to a full-scale war. Therefore, our Army will approve the conditions for settlement proposed by the representative of the 29th Army and signed at 8 P.M. on the 10th and watch for the fulfilment of these conditions. Thus the mobilization of armed forces in Japan proper will be subject to a change of situation for the time being.

(2) However, in case the Chinese forces ignore the conditions for

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settlement referred to in the preceding item and not fulfil them with sincerity, or if the Nanking Government attempts to attack our forces by having the Central Army move northward without any due reason, our Army will take decisive measures. In such a case, however, the Garrison in China will receive approval of the Central Command first.

The above-mentioned policy for dealing with matters concerning the Incident was communicated by telegram to the Garrison in China.

(c) Thus, in the further observation of the changes of the situation the Central Supreme Command learned by the evening of July 16th the following facts from reports from various quarters.

(1) The Chinese Army in North China has been actively making preparation for a war since then and her soldiers have fired on Japanese soldiers on the 14th and on this day the 16th.

(2) The Chinese Central Supreme Command ordered out the air-forces stationed at Kuangtung on the 14th.

(3) On July 15th, the Chinese military strength concentrated in an area stretching to the north of the Lung-Hai rail-way and to the east of the border of the Shansi Province was estimated at approximately thirty divisions including her peace-time units.

(4) Some units of the Chinese Central Army marched into Hopei Province

Under these circumstances, considering the possible danger that we might be hampered by this intentional dragging-out policy of the Chinese authorities and miss the chance of mobilization and dispatch of troops, our Central Supreme Command decided upon a settlement measure to the following effect and instructed our Garrison in China.

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"The Garrison should have Sung Che-yuan affix ^{delete} another signature upon the settlement terms which were signed on July 10th and each term should be shown him concretely (the apology must be made by Sung Che-yuan himself, the punishment of the responsible persons must go as far as the Commander of the 37th Division and the units to withdraw shall be specified) and the fulfilment of these terms must be made by July 19th. In case the Chinese authorities neglect to fulfil our demands, the Garrison shall chastise the Twenty-ninth Army. As the Japanese Government holds to the last the intention to limit the scope of trouble to North China and expects a local settlement, she demands the Nanking Government to draw back the Central Army to the old condition, stop defiant activities towards Japan and not to interfere with the local settlement."

In line with the settlement measures decided in such a way, our Garrison in China has been negotiating with the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army, in North China since the following 17th day, and our diplomatic officials with the Chinese Central Government at Nanking also while the Central Supreme Command proceeded again with preparations for the mobilization of the divisions in Japan Proper which was stopped on July 11th.

(d) On July 18th our Central Supreme Command had a report from the Garrison in China that General Sung Che-yuan of China came to Tientsin to see Lieutenant-general KOZUKI, the Commander of our Garrison in China, and expressed his regret. Yet according to the information which came from the Foreign office on the following day, the 19th, the Nanking Government showed no sincerity in its reply. Such being the case, the Central Supreme Command considered that it was unavoidable to chastise the Twenty-ninth Army, for, despite the apology made by Sung Che-yuan in North China, not only had the fulfilment of other terms

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become quite doubtful judging from the Chinese way of doing things shown for more than ten days up to that time, but also the Chinese Central Government had not changed their above-mentioned attitude. So we pushed forward again on the preparation for mobilization orders to the divisions in Japan Proper. But on July 21st we learned from a report from the garrison in China that the Chinese authorities had punished her responsible persons, and her units began to transfer. Thereupon we decided to put off the mobilization orders again.

- 1) Thus while expecting the situation at the spot to improve, the Central Supreme Command got reports of the Laugfeng Incident on July 25th and those of the Peiping Kuangansen Gate Incident on the following day of the 26th. On the 27th, the Commander of the Garrison in China reported to us that, having exhausted every means for peaceful settlement, he was determined to start using force for chastising the Twenty-Ninth Army on ^{or} after the 29th, and at the same time requested the Central Supreme Command to approve the operation. So the Central Supreme Command gave approval to his plan, but stipulated that the Garrison not carry out operations across the Yungting River.
- 2) As the situation changed, as has been mentioned above, during the twenty days following the night of July 7th, the Central Supreme Command on July 27th took measures to issue orders for the Mobilization of the 5th, 6th and 10th Division, and other required troops. In order to meet the present situation, moreover, the

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Central Supreme Command on July 27th formulated its own first outline of program of operations in China to the following effect:

For the purpose of security stability in Peiping and Tientsin province, about four divisions are to be moved, and their operation areas are roughly restricted to the north of a line between Paoting and Chuoliuchen. In preparation for cases where unavoidable circumstances may make it necessary to protect the residents in Tsintao and Shanghai, one division is to be reserved for each city.

And then the Central Supreme Command, after generalizing all reports, estimated the Chinese strength in the North of the Lunghai Railway (except Shansi province) to amount to approximately 340,000 by the end of July. On the other hand, all the strength sent to Northern China from Japan Proper was expected to concentrate at the front about the end of August, amounting in the aggregate to less than 100,000.

G) The Japanese operation-progresses during the first eight months of the China Incident.

Having passed through a process of circumstances mentioned in the preceding Articles, the Japanese and Chinese came at last to exchange fire with each other in Peiping and Tientsin provinces. After that, the situation gradually became more serious on an unexpectedly enlarging scale. By the end of February in 1938 (the 13th of Showa) when I resigned my post in the General Staff, hostilities came to extend throughout the whole area of Northern China and in the vicinities of Shanghai and Nanking.

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I do not mention the reason why hostilities extended to those areas and what measures the Central Supreme Command took concerning its extension during the above-mentioned period. Through the Japanese operation progresses during the first eight months of this Incident, however, I can positively say that the Japanese Army's tactics were not carried out on a strategically thorough and systematic program.

On August 9th, a Japanese naval officer was shot down in Shanghai, which led to fighting there between the Japanese and Chinese Armies. On account of the hard fighting on the part of our Army, our Settlements nearly got into danger. So, under the necessity of promptly relieving them, two divisions in Japan Proper were prepared for mobilization on the 13th of the same month. On the next day, except for one, the Chinese Central Supreme Command issued orders for the mobilization of all the armies, making ready for an overall war. On the other hand, the Japanese Central Supreme Command had not yet thought of such a thing as an overall war. With the Chinese Central Army in Northern China reinforced, our military strength became inadequate, and so the sending of three more divisions was decided on August 31st.

As can be seen above, the Japanese Central Supreme Command sent the required minimum strength for the purpose of coping with the danger of the situation in each field. Not only was this so, but also for the want of munitions which should have been prepared for a possible outbreak of a great war, prevented the Central

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Supreme Command from freely manipulating troops and made our military commanders at the front get into great difficulties, too. From the middle of September in 1937 (the 12th of Showa), for example, our army under command of General MITSUI in the vicinity of Shanghai had to fight, limiting the number of shells to be used daily by each gun to only several a day.

In fear of a case where, contrary to our own one-sided principle, fighting might enlarge to an unexpected extent, at the beginning of August I submitted to the War Ministry a proposal that the 'mobilization of munitions required for approximately 15 divisions to fight about half a year' should be carried out. However, the leaders at the War Ministry, especially Lieutenant General UMEZU, Yoshijiro, the Vice-Minister of war, maintained the non-enlargement principle so firmly that, they regarded the above figures as excessive and interpreting the possible issue of mobilization-order of those munitions as being a further step to a national war, did not give prompt consent to the proposal.

Thus the above-mentioned plan of the China operation set by the Central Supreme Command on July 29th, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) was soon frustrated, and met up with the large scale and far-reaching Chinese resistance. For some time, we took provisional measures to reinforce soldiers in each phase of the war and obtained tactical victories to secure the front-lines. It is a plain fact that the Central Supreme Command, hoped to stop the overall hostilities every time a single operation on one field was brought to a end, and prepared in secret such a plan. Such was the case at the end of the Military operation in Tientsin districts, at the time the Chinese forces were swept away near PAO TING at the end of the Shanghai military operation, and at the end of the Nanking military operation. Especially, was this so when general peace activity was made by the offices of the German Ambassador in China, before and after the Nanking military operation, and we thoroughly cooperated with the government but unfortunately failed in attaining our object.

(8) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of dealing with the affair.

As stated in the above items, the Central Supreme Command, hoping to localize the incident and to solve it immediately in the local area, was making a study on a general stoppage of resorting to arms and the final dealing with the affair at the end of every operation. And the opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the fundamental policy of settling the affair was in perfect unison with the opinion expressed by the government since the beginning of the incident. Especially the

principle called "KONOE's Three Principles" which stressed morality accorded completely with that which the Central Supreme Command delivered to the government as its opinion, before it was made public.

(9) The opinion of the Central Supreme Command on the problems of the international agreements and the international laws. The motive for the China Incident lies only in Japan's exercising her right of self-defense in the local area. After the negotiation between the commanders of the Japanese and Chinese forces or between the authorities of both states in Nanking for twenty long days, we realized that China had no sincerity in a peaceful solution and we finally resorted to arms. We, as stated above, had no intention in the fundamental policy of dealing with the incident and in the actual process of military operations to injure Chinese sovereignty and the territorial or administrative security therefore we were convinced that our activity did not violate and hurt existing international agreements and our opinion was in accord with what the government often stated to the world on necessary occasions. The Central Supreme Command often called attention to the higher commanders in the front to esteem the interests of the third States, and not to violate the safety of the peoples of third States. I do not remember the exact year and date when I gave such notices. But such notices, as far as my memory runs, were delivered sometimes by wire or sometimes by important figures who were sent from the Central Supreme Command to the front for liaison. In cases where there were damages to the third States, or the peoples of the third States, the Central Supreme Command was ready to make fair investigation on the damages and to make necessary compensation for

them. From the above-mentioned standpoint the 2nd division in the General Staff Office chiefly cooperated with the War Ministry in investigating such matters. The greatest of the accidents of such kind which took place while I held my post as chief was the bombardment of the "Lady Bird." According to my investigation at that time, the ship was bombarded under the orders made by Lieutenant General YAMAGATA, Army Commander, and ^{col. etc.} Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, the intermediate Commander, was not responsible for this accident. I remember that I strongly insisted upon my opinion at the meeting where the leaders concerned were assembled to solve the problem. Concerning the accident itself, I remember, too, that we soon reached a settlement with Britain.

The opinion of the Central Supreme Command regarding previous Notice of appealing to arms and regarding declaration of war.

Relating to the Lukouchiao Incident that occurred on July 7, 1937 (the 12th year of Showa) the Japanese Government issued on the 11th of the same month following statement: "In regard to sending the Army to the North China, the Japanese Government has decided that necessary measures must be taken."

On the same date, at 6:30 P.M. the Central Supreme Command issued an order of sending a part of the Japanese troops in Korea and Manchuria to North China.

After August 9, 1937, the situation in Shanghai became so imminent that Japan was compelled to appeal to arms. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government issued on August 8 a statement saying, "Japan has now been forced to take resolute measures against China with a view of demanding reconsideration on the part of the Nanking Government.

On August 23, the head of the Japanese troops landed near Shanghai.

Earlier in the Incident, the Japanese forces stationed in China had often sent notices and negotiated with the Chinese Authorities, but at last it became evident that there was no

premise for a peaceful solution. Then, the commander of the forces, on the 27th of July, sent an ultimatum to the Chinese Authorities and at the same time made a statement.

On and from July 28 the Army initiated an offensive movement.

In the beginning of the Incident, as I mentioned above, the Central Supreme Command, in case it recognized the necessity of using force, put it into effect after a statement of the Government was issued. The Commander of the Army in North China initiated an offensive movement after a day's notice and after issuing a statement.

The subsequent situation gradually took an unforeseen development and the war situation became unexpectedly serious, so the Central Supreme Command discussed the problem whether Japan should declare war against China or not.

So far as I know at the time of my resignation, the Central Supreme Command realized the characteristics of the Incident as follows:

I. The Incident was started on the part of Japan as a selfdefensive move for what was only a local problem. Thereafter, Japan against her wish had to increase her forces in each zone of fighting as a temporary expedient. Japan had no intention to wage a war against China. If only the offensive manœuvres on the part of China would be brought to an end, the Japanese army would immediately cease taking the offensive.

II. Japan does not consider China as a whole, that is, the whole Chinese people as an enemy.

III. Japan has primarily no politics-strategic intention against China. What Japan desires is nothing more but to cease the armed conflict at once, which is rather a collision of feelings between the two nations; to realize "Friendly Relations between Neighbouring States," "Mutual Respect of the Sovereignty and Territory", and "Reciprocal Economic Cooperation," all of which are the outcome of natural and essential conditions of the two States.

IV To sum up the above four points, to declare war against China is not only to misrepresent Japan's real intention but to be against morality.

V So long as the two states are to a wider extent in a state of war, without declaration of war, Japan can not freely exercise rights based on the International Laws of War, which results in our inconvenience and disadvantage. Japan, however, being influenced by the actual interests, must not lose sight of the substance of the Incident and her basic principles of morality.

VI With declaration of war against China, Japan may be able to justify casualties and the other losses on the part of China. If Japan, however, takes such a measure, she would come to adhere formally and distort the substance of the Incident, and after all to strengthen violence.

This goes against Japan's intention.

From the above mentioned points, the opinion of the Central Supreme Command was that Japan ought not to declare war against China.

On this 26 day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT Torashiro KAWABE (Seal)

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At The same place

Witness: (signed) Junkichi BANNO (seal)

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Torashiro KAWABE (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947

Ref. No. 71971

政シマス。

自分機内ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述

宣誓供述書

供述者 河邊 虎四郎

荒木貞夫 其他

對

亞米利加合衆國其他

極東國際軍事裁判所

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私、河邊虎四郎ハ一九三七年（昭和十二年）三月ヨリ翌年二月末マデ、
參謀本部部長トシテ勤務致シ、其ラ陸軍中央統帥部用兵關係ノ業務ニ當ツテ
居リマシタ其ノ間支那事變ノ勃發ニ際シテ、其ノ後ツテ支那事變直前カ
ラ同僚初期ニ亙ル期間内中央統帥部ノ用兵上ノ問題ニ就キ、詳述致シマス
第一 支那事變勃發直前ノ時期ニ於ケル陸軍中央統帥ノ世界情勢ニ關スル

一、總括的觀察

中央統帥部ガ国防用兵ノ諸計畫ヲ立案シマスル爲ニハ當然其ノ時代ノ世
界的國際情勢ノ觀察ヲイサヨケレバ、イリマセン、ソコデ私ガ參謀本部
長トシテ就任致シマシタ一九三七年（昭和十二年）春頃ニ於キマシテハ
中央統帥部ハ當時ノ世界情勢ニ關シ、概ネ次ノ如ク總括的ノ觀察ヲ下シテ
居リマシタ。

一、歐洲ノ列強ハ第一次世界大戦ノ疲弊ト衰弱カラ漸ク恢復ノ狀態ヲ示シ、特
ニ獨逸兩國ノ活潑ナル對外政策ハ世界ノ新事態ヲ發生シ得ル得ベキ、而
因テ諸リツツアル面シテ全世界ノ西洋諸民族ハ對抗スル三大勢力ニ分岐
シ、之ガ早晩大相續ナル衝突ヲイヌ時期ガアルベキコトヲ豫想セシメル

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二、一ノ一聯邦ハ産業五年計畫ノ施行ニヨリ、其次國力ヲ充實スルト共ニソノ
建國ノ初期盛ニ宣傳シタ風潮的又ハ主義ノ立場ヨリテ寧ろ國辱上ノ利益
問題ヲ中心問題トシテ自國ノ立場ヲ鮮明ニ表ハシツツアル、而シテ其ノ
真一ツ一ツ地方ニ於ケル宣傳ノ材料ハ最近頗ル強化シ、西比利亞鐵道ノ開通
工事モ完成シ、同鐵道ノ實上の價值ヲ著シク向上シタ
三、歐米列強ノ情勢ノ概觀右ノ如クデア、ルガ大戦争ノ發生ハ何レノ國ニ之ヲ
欲セザルベク、之ガ防止ノ爲各國ノ政治家ハ大ニ努力サセテデアロウ
從ツテ、最近ノ未來ニ於テ各強國ガ其ノ存亡ヲ賭スルガ如キ大事件ノ
發生スルコトハ、イデアロウ。

四、支那ニ於テハ國民黨政府ノ統制ニ力益々強化シアルガ、排外的傾向同然
ノ直接的諸工作ハ目下依然トシテ之ヲ差シ控ヘ、滿洲問題ニ關シテハ、
日本ノ態度ニ關シ、激次鐵道ヲ開メ、日支親和ノ傾向ヲ示シ、滿洲ニ對シテ
モ、陸海ノ交通ヲ促進メツツアル、然レトモ、ガラ智識層、學生等ニ於ケル民
族意識ハ愈々昂然ノ傾向アリ、學生、實業家ニ反目、排日ノ風潮ガ激次發潤
シ、又中國共產黨ノ抗日政策ハ、激次強シツツアル、

第二、當時ニ於ケル中央總帥部ノ國防觀

前項ノ如キ世界ノ國際情勢ニ關スル認識ノ下ニ當時中央總帥部ハ日本ノ國防ニ對スル立場ヲ次ノ如ク考察シテ居リマシタ

一、早速豫想スベキ西洋諸民族ノ世界的大争闘ニ對シ日本ハ直接其ノ渦中ニ投ズベキ道義上又ハ利害上ノ問題ヲ有セズ、即チ其ノ局外ニ立ツベキデアル

二、滿洲國ノ隆興ニ於テ日支滿三國ノ親和共在ハ西洋ノ平和ヲ維持シテ我が國防ヲ安固ヲラシムル所以デアツテ、支那ニ於ケル一面ノ反日感又ハ對日輕視感モ、之ハ日本人ノ反省ニ基ク自重心ト、日本ノ國力が充實スルコトニヨリテ自然ニ消散シ、ソレニヨツテ前記三國ノ親和ト相互互食散ノ享得ガ半レ三國共ニ國防ノ安泰ヲ得ラルベキデアル

三、國防上ノ見地ニ立ツテ日本國力ノ實狀ヲ内省スルトキ近代國家トシテ、自衛自存上必要ナル物質的諸要素ガ甚シク劣弱デアルヲ認ム蓋シ現狀ニ以テシテハ、右第一、第二兩共ニ其ノ目的達成ヲ阻障シ得ヨイ

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總上ノ如ク國防面ノ考察ヲ下シテ、中央總帥部ハ其ノ非仁（一九二七

年三月ノ約半年前カラ次ノ方針ヲ確立シテ居リ、私ガ兼任シマシタ時、
私ノ上ニ在タル第一部長カラ實ト此ノ主旨ヲ解説セラレマシタ。ソノ方針ハ
「此ノ世界ノ新情勢ガ繼續イル動キヲ始メタ時期、我ガ国防安泰ヲ期スル
ガ爲メ、陸軍ハ特ニソノ自衛力ノ進歩ニ努力シ他國領土内ニ駐屯スル軍
隊ニ在リテハ諸般ニ百リテ慎重自衛的ノ注意心ヲ深クシ、苟モ國際紛争、口
火ヲ煽動スルガ如キ過誤ヲ犯サマウ努力ヲ絶フベキデアリ、中央統帥部
ハ軍政當局ト協力シ、我ガ国力ノ増進諸政策ニ對シ直接間接ノ援助ヲナス
ベキデアル」トイフ意味デアアルマシテ當時中央統帥部職員ノ共有的ニ遵守
シタ主義信條デアリマシタ

第三 中央統帥部ノ方針ヲ官邸ニ徹底スル爲ニ取リタル手段

前項所述ノ主義方針ハ一九三七(昭和十二年)五月ノ一、統帥部長、軍
令官會議ニ於テ中央統帥部當局カラ解説シテ示サレ尙ホ中央統帥部ハ外
地ニ在ル軍隊中、反日気分ノ醸成ニ浸潤シテ居ルト見ラルルト支那軍ト
近ク接觸シテ居ル支那軍ノ實況ヲ調査スルト共ニ、入念ニ意圖ノ達成
ヲ期スル爲、陸軍省當局トモ協議シテ陸軍省カラ有力ナル將校ヨリ日本

佐チ一九三七年六月ノ河北支ニ派遣シタコトガアリマス。

而シテ右將校が現任陸軍部ニ調査シテ得ツテカラノ報告ニヨリマシ
テ、支那駐屯軍司令部及ソノ各部隊ニハヨク中央統帥部ノ主義ハ諒解セラ
レアツテ、日本軍ニ對スル限り意ヲ安多テ可ヨリトノコトデアリマシタ。

第四 支那軍部前ノ對支作戰計畫

支那ニ對シテハ我が國トノ特殊ノ關係上、從テ一時的ニ小兵力ノ出兵
手餘テクセラレタコトガ最クアリマス、從ツテ一九三七年（昭和十二年）
ノ爲メニモ中央統帥部ノ對支用兵計畫ニハ所在場合ノ保護及居留民ノ保護
ノ爲メ一部出兵ヲ必要トスル場合ニ應ズルモノガアリマシタ、然シテガラ、
支那ニ對シテハ從テカラ大規模ノ兵力使用ヲ行ハントスル企圖ハ全然待ツ
テ居ラズ況ンヤ支那領土ノ防衛ニ巨ル統一的作用計畫ハ豫定シタ事ハア

リマセン

Def 我國ト關係深キ天津北平地方青島、上海、汕頭、廈門、等ノ居留民ニ被害
及居留民ヲ保護スル目的ヲ以ツテ出兵ヲ必要トスル場合ノ派遣隊
Def 兵力、其ノ兵力ノ派遣手続任スル内地師團ノ豫定、兵力輸送ノ方法上等

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駐米ナ一應計費シテアツタニ過ギマセシ

第五 支那駐屯軍ノ任務ト同盟ノ性質

支那駐屯軍ノ任務ハ明治三十三年同盟軍事條約ノ條約ニ基キ列國軍隊ト同盟
「公使館區域ヲ整備シ北京ヨリ滬漢ニ至ル交通線ヲ修繕シ且居留民ヲ保護
スル」ニアリマス、而シテ一九三七年ニ於ケル同盟ノ兵力ハ合計約七千デ

アリマシタ。此ノ外ハ外地諸軍中次ノ特種ヲ持ツテ居リマシタ、

一、純然タル現地ノ整備軍隊デアツテ糧食ヲ有セシメテ無ク作戦軍器材等

ハ殆ソド全ク之ヲ與ヘテイ

二、同時チ整備シタル自軍ノ作戦計畫ヲ立案スルコトヲ命ジテイ

三、支那領土内ニ駐屯シタル整備軍隊イルニ拘ラズ、駐ニ中央幹部部カニ合

令シテ支那軍手對象トシテ訓練スルコトヲ禁ジテアツタ。

第六 盧溝橋事件發生ノ端初ニ於ケル時軍中央幹部部

一九三七年（昭和十二年）七月七日夜ニ起リマシタ盧溝橋事件ニ關スル

一、我が中央幹部部ニ入電シマシタノガ七月八日附デアリマシテ、我が

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前八時出勤ト同時ニ之ヲ知リマシタガ、中央統帥部全般ノ氣持トシテハ冷
靜デアリ、私ハ支那側カラ行ハレタ不快事デアルトハ思ツタガ從來モ此種
事件ハアツタノデ特ニ此ノ事件ヲ大事件トハ認メズ、例ニ依ツテ局地ノ日
支兩軍當面者間ニ話ヲ進ムレバ容易ニ解決出來ルデアロウト輕ク考ヘマシ
タ。

中央統帥部ニ於テハ對等ヲ協定スルガ爲メニ更メテ會議ヲ開クコトヲド
イク、私等關係主務者ガ適當ノ事務要領ニヨリテ連絡ヲ進メマシタガ悉ク
ノ關係者ハ前ニ申シマシタ中央統帥部ノ方針ニ從ヒ何等ノ異論モイク事件
ノ擴大ヲ防止シ速ニ現地官憲ヲ以テ其ノ處理ヲ終了セシメヨウトイフ企圖
ニ一致シテ居リマシタ。然ルニ八日中ニ現地官憲ヨリ到着シタ報告ニヨレバ
支那側ノ態度ハ必ズシテ直ニ官憲ノ終止ヲ思ハシムルモノガイカツタノデ
同日夕六時半頃先ヅ而前ヘズ參謀總長カラ支那駐屯軍司令官ニ對シテ事件
ノ擴大ヲ防止スル爲メ更ニ進メデ兵力ヲ行使スルコトヲ避クベシトノ電
命ヲ與ヘテ自貢ヲ放棄シマシタ

翌九日ニ及ビ中央統帥部ハ事件解決ノ爲日支現地官憲交渉ニ必要ナル指針

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テ電報ニ以テ參謀次長カラ支那駐屯軍ニ與ヘマシタ朗イ
ノ爲メ此ノ降参治國軍ニ關ルコトヲ避ケ寧ネ左記要求ヲ提議シ北軍側ヲ
シテ至極期間ニ承認實行セシムル様處置アリタシ
初盧溝橋事件解決

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左

一、支那軍ノ進軍橋附近永定河左岸駐屯ノ停止

二、將來ニ關スル所要ノ保障

三、直接責任ノ歸屬

四、謝罪

第六、前項ニ關スル狀況推移ニ應ズル中央統帥部ノ處置

(一) 七月十日午後三時ニ及ブ現地軍ノ報告ニヨリ支那側ノ無統制ナル非戦行爲顯著ナル狀況ヲ知リ、中央統帥部ハ支那駐屯軍ニ一部兵力ノ増加ヲ必要ト認メ十日ノ夕刻ニ於テ關東軍ヨリ二師團、朝鮮ヨリ一師團内地ヨリ三師團及其ノ他ノ部隊ヲ増加スルコトニ決定シ、翌十一日ニ巨リ之ヲ準備ヲ進メテ居リマシタ所十一日ノ夕刻ニ支那駐屯軍カラノ報告ガアリ一支部隊ハ昨日以來交渉ヲシタ我ガ方ノ要求ヲ全部承認シタトノ事デアリマシタノデ、中央統帥部ハ直チニ内地師團ノ動員下令ノ計畫ヲ中止スルコトニ決シマシタガ、別ニ在滿京ノ戦ガ武官カラノ報告ニヨリ昨十日支那中央統帥部ハ飛行部隊ノ出動及四師ノ河西省北部省境ニ集中ヲ命シタト云フコトヲ知リ北支ノ情勢漸ク緊張シ難キヲ思ハシムルト共ニ北

支ノ支那側ノ條件實行ニ關シ確信ヲ得ラレマセンノデ其ノ狀況ヲ確認スル
マデハ前記派遣準備中ノ朝鮮及滿洲カラノ部隊ノミハ豫定通り行動セシム
ルコトト定メ、此ノ日十一日夕刻六時二十分頃之ヲ發令シタノデアリマス。

〔爾來中央統帥部ハ、狀況ヲ觀察中諸方面カラノ報告ニヨリ七月十三日夕刻
マデニ概ネ次ノ諸狀況ヲ知リマシタ

1 北支ニ於テハ支那軍ハ陣地構築、軍隊輸送等戰備ヲ整ヘツツアルノミナラ
ラズ本日北京南方郊外ニ於テ通行中ノ我が軍隊ニ射撃ヲ加ヘタ

2 支那中央統帥部ハ昨十二日概ネ長江以北ノ各省ノ軍隊ニ動員ヲ令シ、海
平漢沿線ヘノ集中ヲ命ジタ

以上ノ如キ狀況ニ對シ中央統帥部ハ十三日午後八時次ノ主旨ノ發表處理
ノ方針ヲ決定シマシタ

一、陸軍ハ今夏共、局面不擴大、現地解決ノ方針ヲ堅持シ全面戰爭ニ關ルカ
如キ行動ハ極力之ヲ回避ス、之ガ爲メ二十九軍代ヲ提出セル十日午後八
時前ノ解決條件ヲ是認シテ、之ガ實行ヲ承認スル 依テ内地部隊ノ動員
ハ暫ク狀況ノ推移ヲ見テ之ヲ決スルコトトスル

然レトモ支那軍ニ於テ前記ノ解決條件ヲ無視シテ之ガ實行ニ默然ヲ示サザ

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ル結合、或ハ東京政府ニシテ他ニ中央軍ヲ北トセシメテ攻勢ヲ企圖スル
ガ如キ結合ニハ既ハタル決意ニ出ヅルモノトスル
但シ此ノ結合ニアリテハ支那駐屯軍ハニノ中央部ノ承認ヲ受ケルモノトスル
以上ノ事變処理ノ方針ハ之ヲ支那駐屯軍ニモ電報ヲ以テ通牒シマシタ

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(三) 斯々、中央統帥部ハ更ニ狀況ノ推移ヲ觀察中計方面ノ報告ニヨリ七月十六日夕刻マデニ次ノ諸項ヲ知リマシタ

I 北支ニ於ケル支那軍ノ設備ハ彌後益々整ヘテノツツアルト共ニ十四日及本十六日日本軍隊ニ對スル射擊事件ガアツタ

2 支那中央統帥部ハ十四日廣東ノ空軍ニ出動ヲ命ジタ

3 一月十五日現在ニ於テ渤海線以北、山西省境以東ノ區域ニ集中シタ支那軍兵力ハ平時部隊ヲ含ンデ約三十師ト算ゼラル

4 支那中央軍ノ一部ハ河北省ニ入ツテ來タ

敘上ノ如キ狀況ニ處シ中央統帥部ハ支那側ノ企圖スル邊境策ニ對サレ動員、出兵等ノ時期ヲ誤ルニ至ルノ危險アルコトヲ考慮シ十六日夕刻左ノ要旨ノ解決策ヲ決定シ之ヲ支那駐屯軍ニ指示シマシタ

七月十日訓印ヤル解決條件ニ付更メテ宋哲元ヲシテ訓印ヤシメ各山件ヲ具體的ニ示シ(謝罪ハ宋哲元自身行フコト、責任者ノ處分ハ第三十七師長ニ及ブコト撤退スベキ軍隊ヲ指定ス)之等ノ諸項ノ履行ハ七月十九日ヲ期限トス若シ支那側ガ右期限内ニ我要求ヲ履行ヤヌトキハ第

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二十一日、電ヲ聯機スル日本政府ハ飽クマデ局面ヲ北支ニ限定シ且現地
解決ヲ期スル意圖ナルガ故ニ南京政府ニ對シ中央軍ヲ舊態ニ復シ對
日挑戰的行動ヲ中止シ、且現地ノ解決ヲ妨害ヤヌコトヲ要求スル
敍トノ如ク決定シタ然決策ニ基キ翌十七日カラ北支ニ於テ我カ支那
駐屯軍ト支那第二十九軍トノ間ニ於テ又南京ニ於テ我カ外交官總ト支
那中央政府トノ間ニ折衝カ行ハレ、中央統帥部ハ屢ニ七月十一日ニ中
止シタ内訌兩國ノ要員ニ對シ再ド準備ヲ促ガタノデアリマス
四七月十八日ニ至リ中央統帥部ハ支那ノ宋哲元將軍ガ天津ニ來リ我カ
支那駐屯軍司令官香月中將ニ會見シテ遺憾ノ意ヲ表シタトイフ支那
駐屯軍カラノ報告ヲ受ケマシタガ翌十九日外務省側カラノ通報ニヨ
リマスレバ南京政府ノ回答ニハ誠意ヲ認ムベキモノガアリマヤム、
是ニ於テ中央統帥部トシテハ北支ニ於テ宋哲元ノ陳謝ヲ見タケレド
之マデ十日以上ニ亘ル支那側ノヤリ口カラシテモ爾他ノ諸事件履
行ニ多クノミナラズ、支那中央政府ノ態度亦右ノ通りデアルカラ
前記解決策ニ基キ第二十九軍ノ聯機ハ免レ得ザルモノト判斷シ又内

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地範圍ノ動員下令ノ準備ヲ速メタノデアリマスガ、七月二十一日ニ至
リマスルヤ、支那駐屯軍カラノ報告ニヨリテ支那側ハ責任者ヲ處分シ
部隊ノ移動ヲ開始シタトイフコトヲ知リマシテ茲ニ再度動員下令ヲ延
期スルコトト致シマシタ
(三)斯々テ中央統帥部ハ現地ノ事態ハ好況ニ進ムカト見テ居リマスル中、
七月二十五日鄭坊事件ノ報告ヲ受ケ翌二十六日北平廣安門事件ノ報告
ニ接シマシタ。而シテ其ノ翌二十七日ニ至リマスルヤ、支那駐屯軍司
令官ハ和平解決ノ爲メ軍事ヲ以テ第二十九軍ニ對スル脅威ノ武力
行使ヲ二十九日以後開始スル旨ノ決意ヲ報告スルト共ニ中央統帥部ノ
承認ヲ求メテ参リマシタ
ノコデ中央統帥部ハ之ヲ容認スルト共ニ永定河ヲ超ヘテ作戦行動ヲ行
フベカラズト指定シマシタ

（内）七月二日夜以來二十日間ニ於テ右ノ如ク、狀勢ガ變轉致シマシタノデ
中央統帥部ハ七月二十七日内地ノ第五、第六、第十ノ三師團及ビソノ
他所要ノ部隊ニ動員下令ノ處置ヲ執リ七月二十九日ニ至リ中央統帥部
トシテ始メテ現況ニ應ズル次ノ要旨ノ對支作戰計畫大綱ヲ作りマシタ
即チ「北平天津地方ノ安定ヲ圖ルヲ目的トシテ四師團ヲ充當シ、ソノ
作戰地域ハ概ネ保定涿流鎮ノ線以北ニ限定シ、狀況已ムヲ得ズシテ青
島及上海ニ居留民保護ノ必要アル場合ノ爲メ各一師團ヲ豫定ス」ト云
フノデアリマス
而シテ中央統帥部ハ諸報告ヲ綜合シ七月末頃ニ於ケル支那側ノ兵力ニ
關シ、海線以北（山西省ヲ含マズ）ニ於テ約三十四萬ト判斷シテ居
マシタガ、之ニ對シ日本内地カラ北支ニ派遣セラルル兵力全部ガ現
ニ集中致シマスルノガ概ネ八月下旬トナリ、其ノ際北支ニ在ル我が兵
力總數ハ十萬弱デアリマス

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(七) 支那事變初期八ヶ月間ニ於ケル日本軍ノ作戰推移の概マデニ述ベマシタ
津緯ヲ經テ北平、天津地方ニ於ケル日支間ノ交戦ヲ長ルニ至ツタ次第デア
リマスガ、爾來事態ハ逐次不測ノ擴大ヲ來シ、私ガ執筆本部ヲ離任致シマ
シター一九三八年（昭和十三年）二月末迄ニ於テ北支一帯及上海南京附近ニ
於ケル戦局ガ其ノ局ヲ結ビマシタ此ノ間夫等ノ地方ニ戦局ガ擴張シマシ
タ動因並ニ之ニ關シテ中央統帥部ノ執リタル地方策ニ就キマシテハ之ヲ述ブ
ブルノ情ヲ避ケマスガ、此ノ事變初期八ヶ月間ニ於ケル作戰推移ヲ通シテ
我が日本軍ノ用兵ハ各方面戰略上一貫シタ統一ノ計畫ニヨルモノデナイ
ト云フコトヲ明ラカニ申述ベラレマス
八月九日上海ニ於テ我が海軍將校ガ射殺セラレタコトニシテ發シ同地ニ於
テ日支両軍ノ交戦トナリ我が方ノ苦戦ト共ニ我が租界亦危機ニ頻スルニ及
ビ之カ急迫ナル救援ノ必要ト同月十二日日本内地ニ於テ二ヶ師團ノ動員ヲ
準備致シマシタガ、ソノ翌々日支那中央統帥部ハ全軍ニ動員ヲ令シ全面戰
争ノ態勢ニ移リマシタ、然シ日本中央統帥部ハ未ダ全面戦争ノ如キヲ企ク
考ヘズ、北支ノ戦局ハ支那中央軍ノ増進ニヨリテ我が兵力ノ不足ヲ生ジ
ニハ八日二十一日ニ至リテ更ニ三師團ノ増進ヲ決定シマシタ。斯クノ如ク

2020. 9/11

我が中央統帥部ハ各戦場ノ危険ニ對慮スルコトヲ目途トシテ其ノ時ニ必要
最少限度ノ兵力ヲ逐次派遣シテ居タノミナラズ、大戦争ノ生起ヲ考慮シタ
軍需材料ノ準備ガナカツタ事ハ中央統帥部ノ用兵ヲ束縛シ又戦場ノ實際指
揮官ヲシテ甚ダ困惑セシメタノデアリマス。例ヘバ一九二七年ハ昭和十二
年ノ九月中頃カラ上海附近ニ於ケル我が松井大將ノ率ヘル軍隊ハ砲彈ノ使
用ニ一門一日僅カニ數發ト規整シテ戰闘致シマシタ。尙一九三七年八月ノ
初私ハトモスレバ豫メガ我が一方ノ方針ニ反シテ思ハザル程度ニ強大ス
ル場合アルヲ虞レテ「約十五師團ノ兵力ヲ以テ約半年間戰闘ヲナスニ必要
ナル軍需動員」ヲ行フベキデアルコトヲ主張シ之ヲ主務トスル陸軍省ニ申
込ミマシタ所陸軍省首腦會議ニ陸軍次官樺津美次郎中將ハ不擴大ノ方針ヲ
格違シ之ヲ過大ノ数ト認メ且此ノ軍需動員下令ハ國家的ノ戰爭目的ニ近ヅ
クモノトシテ容易ニ同意ヲ與ヘナカツタ事實ガアリマス。

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クモノトシテ容易ニ同意ヲ與ヘナカツタ事實ガアリマス。

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終末處理ニ關シ研計ヲ進メテ居リマシタガ、事變處理ノ根本方針ニ關
スル中央統帥部ノ意見ハ事實當初カラ展々我が政府ノ表明シタル所ト
全然合致シテ居ルノデアリマシテ特ニ道義性ヲ強調シカノ近衛三原則
ト稱ヒラレマシタ事項之カ發表ヒラルル以前カラ中央統帥部ノ意見ト
シテ政府ニ通ジテ居クルコトト正シク合致シテ居ルノデアリマス
其九、國際條約及國際法諸問題ニ對スル中央統帥部ノ見解中央統帥部
トシテハ支那事變ノ發端ハ局地的ニ我方方ノ自衛權ノ行使ニ過ギズ、
而モ當初北支ノ日支兩軍首腦者間並ニ南京ニ於ケル日支兩政府ノ系
統ニヨル正シク二十日間ニ亘ル折衝ノ後我方方ガ到底支那側ニ平和的
解決ノ同意無キ事實ヲ認メテ遂ニ武力行動ヲ執ルニ至ツクモノデア
ルノミナラズ前諸項ニ於テ詳述スル如ク事實處理ノ根本方針作戦經過ノ
詳細ハ毫モ支那ノ主權獨立並ニ其ノ領土的及行政的保全ヲ侵害セント
スル主旨デハトカツタノデアリマスカラ既存ノ國際條約ヲ蹂躪又ハ破
壞スルモノニアラズト確信シ從ツテ政府ガ果次必要ノ時機ニ於テ世界

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ニ電明致セル所ト其ノ見解チ一ニシテ居クノデアリマス

戦地ニ於クル軍隊ノ行動ニ關シ第三口ノ機益ヲ尊重スルコト第三口人
民ノ安全ヲ脅カスコトノナキ様中央統帥部カラ戦地ノ高級指揮官ニ屢
々注意ヲ喚起致シマシク。私ハ只今何年何月ニ此ノ種ノ注意ヲ與ヘク
カチ記憶ハ致シテ居リマヒンガ時々通信ニヨリ或ハ又中央統帥部カラ
重要ノ人物ガ戦地ニ連絡ニ赴イタ際此ノ注意ヲ傳達シクコトヲ覺エテ
居リマス。而シテ第三口及第三口人ニ損害ヲ與ヘクコトガアツタナラ
バ中央統帥部トシテモ公正ナル調査ヲ行ヒ必要ナル損害賠償ヲ行フコ
トニ吝デアツテハナラヌト云フ用意ノ下ニ參謀本部ニ於テハ主トシテ
第二部ガ陸軍省ト協同シテ調査ヲ致シテ居リマシタ。

私ノ課長トシテ在任間ニアリマシク此ノ種問題中最大ノ事件ハカノ一
レデイバード一號砲臺事件デアリマシク此ノ事件ニ就キ當時私ノ調査
致シマシタ所ニヨルバ之ハ軍司令官柳川中將ノ下シタ命令ノ主旨ニヨ
リテ行ハレクコトデ、中間的ノ指揮官橋本欣五郎大佐ノ責任デハナイ

ト認メラレ本問題ニ關スル關係首腦者合衆ノ席上私ハ強ク其ノ所信ヲ主張シタコトヲ記憶致シマス。ソシテ事件ソノモノニ關シテハ聞エトク英口側トノ間ニ解決ヲ了シタモノト記憶シテ居リマス。

第十、武力行使ノ事前通告ト宣戰布告問題ニ關スル中央統帥部ノ意見一九三七年（昭和十二年）七月七日蘆溝橋事件突發シ同月十一日我が政府ハ「北支派兵ニ關シ政府トシテ執ルベキ所要ノ措置ヲナスニ決シタ」ルコトヲ聲明致シマシタガ、此ノ日夕刻六時三十分中央統帥部ハ朝鮮及ハ滿洲カラ一部ノ兵力ヲ北支ニ派遣スルコトノ命令ヲ傳達シマシタ。

Dox Dec #971
同年八月九日以降上海ニ於ケル武力行使ノ止ムヲ得ザル狀況ニ立到リマスルヤ、我が政府ハ八月十五日「南京政府ノ反省ヲ促ス爲今ノ所平タル措置ヲトルノ已ムナキニ至ツタ」トノ旨ヲ聲明致シマシタガ八月二十三日ニ我が陸軍ノ先頭部隊ガ上海附近ニ上陸シマシタ。

又其時ノ當初、支那駐屯軍ハ幾クビカノ通告ヲ以ツテ支那側ト折衝シ

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タルモノ遂ニ平和的解決ノ目途ナキニ至ツタ時、同軍司令官ハ七月二十七日最後の通告ヲ支那側ニ致シ、同時ニ聲明ヲ發表シ七月二十八日カラ攻戰行動ヲ開始シマシタ。

以上ノ如ク事變ノ初期、中央統帥部ガ用兵上ノ處置ヲ行ハザルヲ得ヌト認メル場合ニハ政府ノ聲明ヲ待ツテ之ヲ實行シ、北支ノ軍司令官ハ其ノ攻戰行動ヲ開始スル一日前ニ通告シ且聲明ヲ發表シテ從之ヲ決行致シマシタ。

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五、宣戰布告ヲイサザル條、應節度ニ亘リ交戰狀態ニ在ルコトハ國際法上ノ交戰法規ヲ自由ニ行使シ得ズ不便不利ガアルケレドモ其ノ事實上ノ利益間口ヲ主トシテ事變ノ本質、我が國ノ道義的根柢主旨ヲ漫却スベキデ
イ
六、宣戰布告ニヨリ支那側ノ人員其ノ他ノ損害ヲ我方ノ爲ニ正當化シ得ルガ加キモ、其ノ形式ニ拘泥シ、此ノ事變ノ本質ヲ蓋テ暴力ヲ強マル作用ヲイスコト、ヨリ我方ノ本意ニ悖ルコトトマル
右ノ主旨ヲ以テ中央統帥部ハ支那側ニ對スル應節度宣言ヲ爲スベキデ
ト見解ヲ示シテ居リマシタ

Dep. No. #171

昭和二十二年三月二十八日於東京

供託者 河邊 辰郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス。

同日

於同所

立會人

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宣
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良心ニ従フ眞ニテ誠ニテ何事ヲモ厭ミズ又何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ。

(署名捺印)

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